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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) spent $13.2 billion on fuel purchases, with 
over 3,000 lives lost in fuel delivery operations between 2003 and 2007.  To reduce both 
of these figures, the DoD is investing in technology to reduce fuel consumption, 
especially in expeditionary and forward operations.  These reductions will cause 
cascading effects throughout the supply chain. 
 The tools of Input-Output Analysis appear to be a natural fit for determining fuel 
costs throughout the supply chain and identifying the best ways to improve the efficiency 
of providing war-fighting capability.  A model of the existing portion of the United States 
Marine Corps supply chain in Afghanistan was built as a proof of concept, along with six 
scenarios that explore different methods of reducing fuel consumption, to estimate the 
fuel multiplier for each component in the supply chain.  This model was useful in 
providing insight and a lower bound on the fully burdened cost of fuel within the 
Afghanistan supply chain.  The results of this analysis show that the impact of force 
protection fuel usage is not as large as previously believed.  In some situations, fuel 
resupply through an airdrop could be a more efficient delivery method than ground 
transportation.  Different methods of achieving reduced fuel consumption have different 
impacts on the fuel multiplier in the supply chain, thus affecting the short-term planning 
ability of the operational commander. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With substantial budget cuts on the horizon for the Department of Defense (DoD), one 
area where significant savings could be found is in the area of energy consumption, on 
which the DoD spent $13.2 billion in 2010.  The field of Input-Output (IO) Analysis 
appeared to be a natural fit for determining fuel costs and areas in which fuel could be 
used more efficiently.  An IO model predicts the effects of a change in one part of an 
economy, on the other parts of the economy.  While IO is usually used to model inputs 
and outputs to production in a national economy, it can be tailored to model a more 
focused area such as DoD energy usage. 
A model of the existing portion of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
supply chain in Afghanistan was built as a proof of concept and was used to estimate the 
fuel multiplier for each component in the supply chain.  The model includes air and 
ground fuel transport and force protection, and is based on information provided by a 
supply chain officer recently returned from Afghanistan. 
Once the baseline scenario was modeled based on historical data, six scenarios 
were developed to explore the IO model by changing specific aspects of the supply chain 
to determine the effects those changes had on the model and fuel multiplier at each 
component.  Additionally, these scenarios were generated in such a way as to create an 
understanding of the fuel drivers within a supply chain, so that this model and its results 
could be used to understand supply chains in future Areas of Responsibility (AORs).  
Each scenario was a modification of the historical scenario, and all findings were related 
back to this historical case. 
The main advantage of the IO model is that it can be used to calculate the fuel 
multiplier.  In this case, the fuel multiplier for a given component is the amount of fuel 
required for delivery to Kandahar, per gallon consumed in each component in the supply 
chain.  A one-gallon increase of fuel usage by the end user does not translate to a  
one-gallon fuel increase in total demand for fuel entering the supply chain, but it 
 xvi
increases total fuel demand by a factor greater than one.  The multiplier is different at 
each component, due to the means by which the fuel is delivered to that location.  
Quantifying the fuel multiplier is the primary reason for using IO in determining the fully 
burdened cost of fuel (FBCF).  The importance of this effect in the fuel supply chain 
cannot be overstated and is one normally overlooked by other models that are used to 
calculate the FBCF.  Impacts directly associated with fuel usage (direct purchase costs, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and convoy losses) are proportional to the total fuel used in 
the supply chain, not just end-user fuel consumption.  An estimate of the fuel multiplier 
enables the decision maker to make more informed strategic and operational decisions 
pertaining to operational fuel usage and logistic constraints on the battlefield. 
This analysis produced the following findings: 
• The impact of force protection fuel usage on the supply chain is not as 
large as initially expected. 
• Due to geography, fuel resupply through an airdrop could be more 
efficient than a ground convoy, in some circumstances. 
• The method of achieving reduced fuel consumption has a direct impact on 
the fuel multiplier, which affects the short-term planning ability of the 
operational commander. 
This research has provided important insight into determining FBCF within the 
DoD using an IO, but it has only scratched the surface of the wealth of benefits this 
approach could have in the future.  Fuel multipliers calculated with this model provide a 
lower bound for the operational commander, with respect to the fuel requirements within 
the region.  Factors such as manpower and personnel costs, greenhouse gas emissions, 
and equipment and lives lost associated with fuel consumption, need to be captured in 
order to produce a more complete estimate of FBCF.  Future research should expand on, 
and tap into, IO’s ability to provide a flexible and accurate model for determining FBCF. 
 xvii
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 With substantial budget cuts on the horizon for the Department of Defense (DoD), 
one area where significant savings could be found is in the area of energy consumption.  
Studies have found that the DoD accounts for 93% of all United States government fuel 
usage, equating to five billion gallons, placing the DoD as the 34th highest user of oil in 
the world (Lengyel, 2007). 
 The field of Input-Output (IO) Analysis appeared to be a natural fit for 
determining fuel costs and areas in which fuel could be used more efficiently.  The IO 
model predicts the effects of a change in one part of an economy, on the other 
components of the economy.  While IO is usually used to model all inputs and outputs to 
production in a national economy, it can be tailored to model a more focused area such as 
the DoD’s energy usage. 
 While the development of this model would allow the DoD to have a clearer 
picture of DoD-wide energy usage and prospective savings, the real advantage of this 
model would be its implementation on a command or unit level.  The need for this can be 
seen in our current combat operations and the measures in-country Marine companies are 
taking to reduce their fuel usage due to insurgents who are increasingly attacking fuel 
supply convoys within Afghanistan (Rosenthal, 2010).  If an IO model was created for 
this particular instance, the decision makers could readily see how a savings of a certain 
number of barrels of fuel per month would translate into a reduction in the force 
protection requirements for that specific Area of Responsibility (AOR). 
A. DOD FUEL CONSUMPTION AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS 
From remote outposts in the hills of Afghanistan to reserve centers across the 
United States, the DoD’s footprint and subsequent energy usage are global.  The missions 




humanitarian and disaster relief that has been provided in areas such as Haiti and Japan; 
training and exercises conducted with other military forces; and routine deployment 
cycles. 
In 2010, all of the United States armed services used more than five billion 
gallons of fuel, mostly JP-8 or JP-5, while conducting operations, which had an estimated 
cost of $13.2 billion—a 225% increase from the cost in 1997 (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, 2011).  The $13.2 billion price tag only accounts for the price of fuel alone and 
does not consider the associated delivery costs.  Depending on the mode of 
transportation, the delivery price for a gallon of fuel can change tremendously.  The cost 
to deliver fuel in an air-to-air scenario was estimated to be between $20 and $25 per 
gallon, with the large majority of the cost going to items other than the price for the fuel 
at the source (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011).  United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) also estimates that the cost of delivering fuel by air could 
be as high as 10 times the cost of ground delivery (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011).  
While this may seem prohibitive, the Pentagon’s comptroller office, in 2009, examined 
the cost to the Army for delivering fuel in an operational environment and determined 
that it was between $100 and $600 per gallon, dependent on the range of the battle space 
(Dimotakis, Grober, & Lewis, 2006). 
Another aspect of fuel cost that must be considered are the security and materiel 
losses that have been associated with the fuel delivery process.  In the campaigns of Iraq 
and Afghanistan from fiscal year (FY) 2003 to FY 2007, at least 3,000 military personnel 
and civilians were killed or wounded while conducting fuel delivery operations (Army 
Environmental Policy Institute, 2009).  Even with the lessons learned from these attacks 
and those that have happened in the subsequent years, the number of attacks on convoys 
during 2010 was estimated to be around 1,100 (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011).  The 
enemy’s ability to target these deliveries will continue to improve, which is why it is 
essential for the DoD to recognize the true costs of today’s energy sources, while 
continuing to find new and improved ways to “fuel” our operations of the future. 
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B. CALLS FOR CHANGE IN DOD FUEL USAGE 
In June 1999, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) (OUSD [AT&L]) reached out to the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) to “identify technologies that improve fuel efficiency of the full range of weapons 
platforms (land, sea, and air) and assess their operational, logistics, costs and 
environmental impacts for a range of practical implementation scenarios” (OUSD 
[AT&L], 1999, p. 1).  The resulting report recommended that decisions be based on the 
true cost of delivered fuel and to include fuel efficiencies into the acquisition process 
(DSB, 2001). 
The JASON Group (Dimotaki et al., 2006) attempted to determine how to 
decrease the DoD’s reliance on fossil fuels.  While the JASON Group found that only 2% 
to 3% of the overall DoD budget in FY05 went to the procurement of fossil fuels, they 
identified three main reasons for the importance of reducing reliance: 
• Fossil fuels account for a large portion of the life-cycle costs for aircraft 
and nonnuclear ships. 
• Extreme multiplier effects characterize fossil fuel use. 
• Fossil fuel use results in logistical and operational restrictions.  (Dimotakis 
et al., 2006). 
 The report did caution that while there may be time for the DoD to address its fuel 
issues, the JASON Group strongly encouraged the DoD to begin immediate reduction on 
fossil fuel dependency due to the unpredictable nature of the industry. 
In 2007, LMI Government Consulting was asked by the Office of Force 
Transformation and Resources to establish a roadmap for the DoD Energy Strategy in 
which it identified four areas (strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental) with 
disconnects between “DoD’s current energy consumption practices and the capability 
requirements of its strategic goals” (LMI Government Consulting, 2007, pp. 1–3). 
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In the fiscal and operational areas, the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 
estimates for providing fuel in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom was 20,000 soldiers 
and $1 million per day (Dimotakis et al., 2006).  The operational disconnect was further 
amplified by MajGen Richard Zilmer, United States Marine Corps (USMC), “Reducing 
energy use at outlying bases reduces the frequency of logistics convoys required to 
provide their energy needs thereby reducing danger to the Marines, soldiers and sailors” 
(LMI Government Consulting, 2007, p. E-25). 
Moreover, the DoD is unable to adequately account for energy considerations in 
operational and force development analysis, which affects investment decisions, the real 
cost of fuel to the DoD should be defined as “more than just the DESC standard price 
used for programming, budgeting and investment decisions” (LMI Government 
Consulting, 2007, pp. 2–10).  This culminated in the main recommendation of LMI’s 
study, which was to “incorporate energy considerations (energy use and energy logistical 
support requirements) in all future concept developments, capability developments, and 
acquisition actions” (LMI Government Consulting, 2007, p. 4). 
Due to the overall lack of adherence to the 2001 DSB recommendations,  
OSD (AT&L) contracted with the DSB to conduct another study, with four main  
focus areas: 
• National benefits of the DoD’s usage of alternative energy sources; 
• Obstacles within the DoD that are not allowing the recommended changes 
to be implemented; 
• Areas where renewable and alternative energy sources could be deployed; 
and 
• Areas where fuel demand could be minimized. 
With this mandate, the DSB found that the DoD was not implementing two key areas 
from their 2001 report: 
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• Establishment of key performance parameters (KPP) for battlespace fuel 
demand; and 
• Establishment of the true cost of delivering fuel. 
However, as of the end of 2009, the OUSD (AT&L) promulgated seven-step 
method to calculate the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) which appears to have 
become the standard for DoD calculations (Military Operations Research Society 
[MORS], 2009).  The seven-step method will be described in more detail in Chapter II. 
C. DOD GUIDANCE AND POLICIES 
In January 2007, President Bush signed Executive Order 13423, Strengthening 
Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management.  This document 
outlined the nation’s goals for acquisition, energy efficiency, and renewable energy, 
while also establishing objectives for the DoD to maximize their energy use. 
Shortly after the issuance of Executive Order 13423, OUSD (AT&L) issued a 
new policy concerning FBCF that stated, effective immediately, it is DoD policy to 
include the fully burdened cost of delivered energy in trade-off analysis conducted for all 
tactical systems, with end items that create a demand for energy, and to improve the 
energy efficiency of those systems, consistent with mission requirements and cost 
effectiveness (OUSD [AT&L], 2007). 
After the issuance of the policy statement, Mr. Chris DiPetto (Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense) gave testimony to the United States House Committee on Armed 
Services Readiness Subcommittee, where he stated, “strategic planning and long-term 
costing should include not only the price of the fuel but all logistical effort to deliver the 
fuel and that OUSD (AT&L)’s immediate focus was to mature the technology for 
estimating the fully burdened cost of fuel” (DiPetto, 2008, p. 4). 
The issuance of these two policy statements resulted in the update of DoD 
Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, which now states the 
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new policy established from the OUSD (AT&L) Guidance of 2007 pertaining to using 
the FBCF.  In essence, this forced the use of the FBCF into the analysis of alternatives 
(AOA) stage of the decision-making process, making it a key hurdle that must be 
accomplished prior to approval of the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  In theory, 
any program that does not include the FBCF in its analysis could face delays or 
cancelation by the MDA. 
Congress enacted federal law with the passage of the Duncan Hunter National 
Defense Authorization Act (DHNDAA) in October 2008, which authorized the funding 
of DoD weapon system procurement, but placed a stipulation that logistical fuel costs 
were to be included during the acquisition process.  Specifically, the DHNDAA mandates 
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) “to require life-cycle cost analysis for new 
capabilities include the fully burdened cost of fuel during analysis of alternatives and 
evaluation of alternatives and acquisition program design trades” (DHNDA Act, 2008).  
The DHNDAA further established deadlines that ranged from six months to three years 
for DoD to implement the act’s requirements. 
In February 2010, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was published in 
response to the 2009 passage of the DHNDAA.  The QDR describes how the DoD plans 
to meet the deadlines set within the DHNDAA, while also meeting the challenges of 
today, while preparing for future conflicts.  To this end, the QDR clearly states that the 
DoD, “will fully implement the statutory requirement for the energy efficiency Key 
Performance Parameters and fully burdened cost of fuel set forth in the 2009 NDAA” 
(Secretary of Defense, 2010, p. 87). 
Following the issuance of the 2010 QDR, the DoD published an Operational 
Energy Strategy in May 2011, which intends to establish a new way forward for the DoD 
on how energy is consumed during military operations.  The DoD identifies three goals in 
which they intend to reduce the use of energy, make the energy supply chain more 
secure, and ensure future energy security.  To ensure achievement of these objectives, the 
Operational Energy Strategy will become an annual document produced by the DoD, 
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which will continually update the goals for energy reduction, while also providing 
metrics on how the DoD and its services are meeting the established objectives (Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
In March 2011, the USMC established a comprehensive energy strategy that is 
designed to place their forward-deployed units on the leading edge of energy efficiency.  
This strategy attempts to reverse the trends of the past decade, where infantry companies 
today are using more energy than an infantry battalion used 10 years ago.  Their strategy 
has set a deadline of 2025 for all expeditionary forces to be self-sustaining, with the only 
fuel requirements being needed for the vehicles associated with the force.  To ensure that 
the USMC meets this goal, several milestones have been established for 2015 and 2020 
that will place them on the glide slope to meet the 50% efficiency gains (Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, 2011). 
In June 2011, The Department of the Navy (DON) also established a policy for 
evaluating energy factors in the acquisition process that intends to “transform the way the 
Department of the Navy (DON) uses energy on our installations and in our operational 
forces” (Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 2011, p. 1).  In order to accomplish this, the 
DON has established the following five goals that will achieve this mandate: 
1. Mandatory calculation of the fully burdened cost of energy. 
2. Create an energy component of the Affordability target. 
3. Energy considerations in acquisition plans. 
4. Energy considerations in the Gate Review Process. 
5. Energy review of legacy systems.  (Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 2011) 
D. THESIS OBJECTIVES (BENEFIT OF THE STUDY) 
From the evidence presented in previous government studies, it is apparent that 
the DoD must include the real FBCF in its operations and acquisitions process.  The 
current methods only capture a percentage of the actual cost of fuel and leave out 
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multiplying factors that would significantly increase the cost.  Without a precise 
estimating tool, DoD decision makers will be forced to make budget cuts using an 
inaccurate picture.  There is clearly a need for a way to estimate the impact of fuel 
demand for use in operations and acquisition analysis decisions, to reduce DoD’s 
financial, operational, and support costs and enhance its capability and security. 
This thesis addresses whether a DoD FBCF IO model can be useful to model and 
predict savings costs for a forward-deployed unit.  While a DoD-wide model would 
provide a good planning tool for top-level decision makers, a tool that can be used on the 
ground, in theater, would provide a more efficient means of evaluating the financial and 
operational impact of proposed alternatives for conserving fuel. 
To the extent that the IO model provides useful insights unit evaluation of a small 
unit, a wealth of future research opportunities open up to examine not only DoD entities, 
but also other organizations within the government.  The practical challenges to building 
an IO model in this context can be applied to other DoD entities to determine if their 
organization can be mapped using the IO process, and indicate the data collection needed 
to support a useful IO model for estimating FBCF. 
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II. FULLY BURDENED COST OF FUEL/INPUT-OUTPUT 
ANALYSIS 
A. FULLY BURDENED COST OF FUEL (FBFC) 
1. Definition 
There are two generally accepted definitions by the DoD pertaining to the FBCF.  
The first is from the Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG), which defines FBCF as “the cost 
of fuel itself plus the apportioned cost of all fuel delivery logistics and related force 
protection required beyond the DESC point of sale to ensure refueling of the systems” 
(Defense Acquisition University [DAU]. 2009, p. 1).  The other can be found in the 
DHNDAA, which defines FBCF as “the commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all 
personnel and assets required to move and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the 
point at which the fuel is received from the commercial supplier to the point of use” 
(DHNDAA, 2008, p. 67). 
The FBCF is meant to be another tool in the toolbox for planners when 
determining which platforms or systems should be purchased.  Although it is a key tool, 
it is not a predictor of future events or scenarios that the platform or system will be 
placed in during an operating wartime environment.  This view is clearly the position of 
DAG as they conclude that the FBCF compliments the planning process pertaining to 
capabilities and performance metrics (DAU, 2009). 
2. Calculation Steps 
Table 1 displays the seven steps necessary to calculate the FBCF, according to the 





Table 1.   The seven cost elements used by OUSD (AT&L) for estimating FBCF 
(From:  DAU, 2009). 
a. Commodity Cost of Fuel 
The Defense Logistics Agency-Energy (DLA-E), formerly known as 
DESC, is the sole provider of fuel to the DoD.  Figure 1 represents the wholesale supply 
chain for DLA-E.  Through DLA-E’s network, fuel is provided around the globe and the 
price is set at a standard DLA-E price for all services.  Like other DoD corporate 
organizations, DLA-E sets the standard price, for the current FY, based off of the 
previous 18-month price history and not the current standard price for fuel.  The 
reasoning for this process is to attempt to shield the DoD from the price fluctuations that 
occur with the price of fuel on a daily basis.  These fluctuations in the market price 
contribute to either a profit or loss for DLA-E, which is then calculated into the following 




Figure 1.   The DESC, now DLA-E, supply chain (From:  DAU, 2009). 
b. Primary Fuel Delivery Asset Operation and Support Cost 
The service-specific assets that are used to transport the fuel from the 
DLA-E receiving point to the end user generate the operation and support (O&S) costs.  
The cost associated with O&S consists of the operation and maintenance cost for the fuel 
delivery assets, in addition to the personnel cost for those individuals who operate and 
maintain the equipment.  Each service tracks these costs through the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC). The VAMOSC database can 
be accessed at https:/www.vamosc.navy.mil.  The source for this data encompasses over 
138 organizations that make up the DON enterprise. 
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c. Depreciation Cost of Primary Fuel Delivery Assets 
These costs are specific to the equipment used to transport the fuel.  While 
there are numerous accounting methods to determine depreciation, OUSD (AT&L) has 
made the straight-line method the preferred one for DoD calculations. 
d. Direct Fuel Infrastructure O&S and Recapitalization Cost 
This cost only pertains to the facilities that are used and operated by the 
services for the purpose of fuel delivery, which are not a part of the DLA-E infrastructure 
system.  These costs are monitored and distributed by the OUSD (Installations and 
Environment). 
e. Indirect Fuel Infrastructure 
Per the recommendation of OUSD (AT&L), these costs are allocated on a 
per capita basis and are only those required to maintain the direct fuel infrastructure.   
f. Environmental Cost 
While there is no standard calculation for these costs, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Program, Analysis, and Evaluation) has developed a method to 
estimate these costs by combining the European carbon emission offset cost with the 
standard DoD hazardous material and cleanup costs found in the DoD Financial 
Management Regulation Vol. 4 Ch. 13 produced by the OUSD (Comptroller) (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 2011) (DAU, 2009). 
g. Other Service and Platform Delivery Specific Costs 
According to OUSD (AT&L) these costs have traditionally exceeded all of 
the previous six cost factors combined.  The justification for this can be found in the 
factors that make up this area, specifically force protection, depreciation, and manpower 
costs for non-fuel delivery assets.  Of those factors, the force protection aspect has 
become the major factor, especially in combat areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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3. Prior FBCF Studies 
Corley (2009) analyzed how using the FBCF would have affected the analyses 
done by Navy Major Defense Acquisition Programs.  In order to determine the effect, 
Corley used a standard Navy destroyer operating in different environments while using 
the FBCF calculator developed by the OUSD (AT&L).  The results of his analysis 
showed that between 30% and 50% of the FBCF could be accounted for by using the 
standard price of the fuel set by DLA-E.  Based on his finding that the true cost of fuel 
consists of 50% to 70% of nonfuel cost, he recommended that using FBCF would be the 
fiscally responsible way to determine fuel costs during the acquisition process  
(Corley, 2009). 
Truckenbrod (2010) focused on how the FBCF could be applied to the Navy 
aviation community.  Truckenbrod used the OUSD (AT&L) calculator to determine the 
FBCF for an F/A-18 E/F aircraft and found that the FBCF for the aircraft was twice as 
much as for the destroyer used in Corley (2009).  While certain assumptions that were 
used in both calculations may have contributed to the large difference between the two 
figures, Truckenbrod concluded that the main factor affecting the FBCF for the F/A-18 
was aerial refueling.  Truckenbrod’s final recommendation was for the Navy to continue 
to look at fuel-saving technologies, while also modifying existing aircraft to extend their 
endurance (Truckenbrod, 2010). 
Roscoe (2010) compared the methodologies used by the military services to 
calculate the FBCF and found there were differences in how each service was calculating 
FBCF.  The United States Navy (USN) and USMC based their calculations on the OUSD 
(AT&L) model, while the Air Force created its own calculation, with the Army still 
developing its process.  A comparison was made between the Air Force and OUSD 
(AT&L) models due to the difference in calculation, with the Air Force using a 
deterministic model, while OUSD (AT&L) uses a stochastic process.  After running each 
model through several scenarios, Roscoe found there was not a statistical difference 
between the results of the two models, resulting in the following three recommendations: 
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• The definition for the FBCF should be uniform across the services. 
• The use of scenarios should be maintained when calculating the FBCF 
during AOAs. 
• Due to the unpredictability of real world scenarios, a stochastic process 
should be incorporated into FBCF calculations. 
B. INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
1. History 
The theory of IO was developed by Professor Wassily Leontief during the 1930s 
as a way to capture how the changes in one segment of the economy can be felt and 
measured in the economy as a whole.  As Lin and Polenske (1998) write, IO models have 
several purposes.  They provide the framework for representing flows of goods and 
services in an economy.  Changes in the input matrix can highlight changes in production 
technology and processes over time.  Finally, a national accounts IO model can be 
adapted to produce an enterprise IO model to support other enterprise-specific analyses. 
The model used for IO is a set of linear equations, represented by a matrix with 
each sector represented by a row and a column.  The columns of the matrix represent the 
inputs for the sector and the rows represent the outputs.  Three assumptions are made in 
order to simplify the problem: 
• Only one homogeneous commodity is produced by each sector. 
• Each sector uses a fixed input ratio for the production its output. 
• Each sector has a constant returns to scale.  (Chaing, 1984, p. 116) 
Table 2 illustrates the coefficient matrix used in IO.  The first subscript 
corresponds to the input and the second subscript corresponds to the output for  
the coefficient.  The coefficient is equal to the amount of output from the row sector 

































Table 2.   The input-coefficient matrix used as the basis for IO  
(After:  Chaing, 1984). 
From this matrix, flow-balance requires the following: 
 1 1 2 2i i i in n ix a x a x a x d i= + + + + ∀L , (2.1) 
where ix  is the output level of the sector to meet the requirement for the other n  
industries and id  is the final demand for the output (Chaing, 1984).  This set of equations 
can be solved using the matrix equation below: 
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         (Chaing, 1984) 
2. Previous Research 
Wu and Chen (1990) use IO to analyze short-run energy problems because the IO 
model is well suited to capture the relationships among and multiplier effects of all 
entities in the economy and energy usage in terms of output. 
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The results of their analysis show that a static IO model can be applied to energy 
issues, but there are considerations that must be taken into account.  By using the static 
model, the accuracy of the results may diminish, but it does provide a lower bound cost 
and shorter time frame for those results.  Additionally, they were able to find a solution to 
the double counting problem that exists due to the multiplier effect in the static model, 
making the model a more efficient tool for energy calculations. 
Albino, Izzo, and Kuhtz (2002) attempted to create IO models that can be used to 
examine both a local and global supply chain.  In order to do so, they define the supply 
chain as “a network of production processes which can be localized within and outside a 
given geographic area.  Each process can be defined as a system that produces output 
flows in consequence of input flows” (Albino et al., 2002, p. 119).  They created two 
models, one based on the materials and the other on energy flows for the supply chains. 
The model can determine the output, material, and waste created during the 
process.  Additionally, these models can reflect changes in the production process or 
location, which will give both positive and negative results for the changes in the supply 
chain.  Their analysis did show that these models “can be effective to negotiate at supply 
chain level as well as at local level a common policy for the management of resources 
and wastes” (Albino et al., 2002, p. 130). 
Albino, Dietzenbacher, and Kuhtz (2003) applied their earlier research to 
industrial districts to determine the amount of resources, energy, and pollution for those 
areas.  This model can be used for both accounting and forecasting.  As an accounting 
tool, the model can use current data to investigate materials and energy flows (Albino et 
al., 2003).  As described in Albino et al. (2002), this model is adaptive and can reflect the 
changes that occur over time within the district to include the environmental impact.  One 
additional aspect of this model is its consideration of areas that do not produce the energy 




Lu and Rencheng (2007) modified the IO model to evaluate an international 
supply chain specifically for a multilocation production system.  Figure 2 illustrates such 
a system. 





Figure 2.   The multilocation distribution model used by Lu and Rencheng to evaluate an 
international supply chain (From:  Lu & Rencheng, 2007). 
This paper breaks new ground in the area of IO analysis by modeling a dispersed 
production system and the resulting increase in transportation costs due to dispersion in 
energy and material consumption during the process.  Additionally, this model has helped 
resolve some of the linear programming issues in solving supply chain problems by 
introducing the IO coefficients into the equation, which account for the relationship and 
multiplier effect in system, therefore allowing linear programming models to solve for 
problems with a large number of constraints and variables (Lu & Rencheng, 2007). 
 These recent uses of an IO model on an organization, rather than on an economy, 
open the door for this type of research to be used in the DoD.  This thesis captures the 





IO model.  By doing so, it will demonstrate how the current methods of calculating the 
FBCF are not accurately estimating those costs, while also demonstrating this approach 




A model of the existing portion of the USMC supply chain in Afghanistan was 
built as a proof of concept and was used to estimate the fuel multiplier for each 
component in the supply chain.  The fuel multiplier is the amount of fuel required to be 
delivered to Kandahar, per gallon consumed in a given component in the supply chain.  
The model includes air and ground fuel transport and force protection. 
A. AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY CHAIN 
Figure 3 shows the flow of fuel from Kandahar to the Forward Operating Bases 
(FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs), based on information provided by Jeffrey Kausek 
(a former USMC Captain who separated from active service on May 30, 2011, as 
Battalion Logistics Officer for 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st 
Marine Division).  Mr. Kausek recently served two tours in Afghanistan as a supply 
officer for the USMC.  While there are real-world distinctions between COPs and FOBs, 
in this model the COPs are pure consumers in the supply chain.  The FOBs consume fuel, 
but they also serve the role of a supplier to the COPs, so their overall demand signal in 
the supply chain is greater than their on-site consumption.  This distinction is illustrated 
in Figure 3, which shows the flow of fuel through Deleram and Now Zad supply chain. 
Most of the fuel transportation is by ground convoys.  Now Zad and Golistan 
receive fuel via an airdrop.  Now Zad receives fuel via ground about 90% of the time, 
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Figure 3.   Map of the Deleram and Now Zad supply chain. 
The estimated usage rates, transportation method, and travel time for each of the 
FOBs and COPs in the region provided by Mr. Kausek are given in Table 3 (J. Kausek, 
personal communication, May 24, 2011). 
Origin Destination Transport Method Distance (miles)
Transport 
Time (hrs)
Fuel Consumption on Site
(thousands of gallons per week)
Kandahar Camp Leatherneck Convoy 110 5 30
Camp Leatherneck Now Zad Air 40 0.36 0.8
Camp Leatherneck Golistan Air 90 0.81 2
Camp Leatherneck Now Zad Convoy 40 18 7.2
Camp Leatherneck Deleram Convoy 60 3 10
Now Zad ANP Hill Convoy 0.5 0.5 1
Now Zad Mt. Olympus Convoy 1.5 0.75 1
Now Zad Kanji Sofla Convoy 6 2 1
Now Zad Changowal Convoy 2 1.25 1
Now Zad Bar Now Zad Convoy 13 4 1
Now Zad Dehanna Convoy 5 1.25 1
Now Zad Nomad Village Convoy 6 2 1
Deleram Buji Bhast Pass Convoy 25 8 2
Deleram Bakwa Convoy 50 7 3
Deleram Barrows Convoy 40 5.5 2
Deleram Geiger Convoy 30 4 1
(i) (cj )(tij
m )(dij )(m)( j)
 
Table 3.   This table shows the transportation method, distance, transportation time, 
fuel usage, and transport for the Deleram and Now Zad supply chain. 
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Based on the information from Mr. Kausek, Medium Tactical Vehicle 
Replacements (MTVRs), better known as 7-ton trucks, are used to move the fuel over the 
ground.  Each MTVR can carry two 900-gallon fuel pods.  The MTVRs have an 
estimated fuel usage of 4.5 miles per gallon (mpg) or 13.3 gallons an hour (Headquarters, 
United States Marine Corps, 2007).  For air transport, the CH-53 is used and has a 
payload capacity of 36,000 pounds and a fuel usage rating of 600 gallons an hour 
(Thoms, 2007). 
Force protection assets are also required to protect the convoy during ground 
transport.  The two main vehicles used for force protection are the Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) and the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (MATV).  The MRAP 
has an estimated fuel usage rating of 5.5 mpg or 10.2 gallons an hour, (Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Army, 2009), while the MATV achieves an improved fuel usage rate of 6.6 
mpg or 6.9 gallons an hour (1 Marine Expeditionary Force [MEF], 2010). 
Several policies pertaining to force protection also affect the number of vehicles 
required to operate in a convoy.  At a minimum, four vehicles are required to make up the 
convoy during operations.  Of these four vehicles, two must be force protection vehicles, 
with an additional force protection vehicle added for every five transport trucks in the 
convoy.  Since the MATVs are more fuel efficient, they are used in preference to MRAPs 
at about a 2:1 ratio. 
Based on the data available, the following variables and indices were used in the 
model for computation purposes: 
1. Notation 
a. Indices 
  i = Source component. 
  j = Destination component. 
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  m = Transportation method from the source component i  to the   
  destination component j .  m ∈{Air, Convoy} 
b. Data Variables 
  ijd = The distance between source component i  and the destination  
  component j  in miles. 
  mijt = The time to travel between source component i  to the destination  
  component j  using transportation method m , in hours. 
  jc = The amount of fuel required (thousand gallons per week) at   
  destination component j  for war-fighting operations. 
  j
x =  The output quantity of component j  (thousand gallons of fuel per  
  week) for supplying components. 
  ijtv = The transportation vehicle used between source component i  and  
  destination component j .  tv∈{MTVR, CH-53} 
  ijfv = The fuel transportation vehicle used between source component i   
  and destination component j .  fv∈{MRAP, MATV} 
  tvg = Fuel consumption for transportation vehicle tv  in gallons per hour. 
  fvg = Fuel consumption for force protection vehicle fv  in gallons per  
  hour. 
  tvvc = The payload capacity of vehicle tv  in gallons. 
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c. Fuel Requirements Variables by Component and Equations 
  
m
ijq = The total fuel required at destination component j  by transportation  
  method m from source component i . 
 For each component j , qij
m  is the total amount of fuel that needs to be 
pushed to the component from component i  by mode m  to meet its war-fighting 
requirement ( )jc  plus any requirements it incurs from downstream components it 
supports, ( )jx .  These additional requirements would include the downstream 
component’s war-fighting requirements in addition to any transportation and force 
protection fuel requirements. 
For consuming components, 
 mij j
m i
q c=∑∑ . (3.1) 
 For supply chain components, the following equation calculates their fuel 
requirement: 
 mij j j
m i
q x c= +∑∑ . (3.2) 




ijF = The fuel required for force protection per unit of fuel transported  
  from i  to j  by mode m  in thousand gallons per week. 
  mijT = The fuel required for transportation per unit of fuel transported from  
  i  to j  by mode m in thousand gallons per week. 
  mijn = The number of transportation vehicles of type ijtv  per week required  













⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
. (3.3) 
m
ijfn = The number of number of vehicles per week required to   
 provide force protection from i  to j  by mode j , as determined in   
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. (3.4) 
 From these formulas mijF and 
m
























= . (3.6) 
B. THE FBCF/IO MODEL  
From the historical data provided by Mr. Kausek, an IO model was created.  A 
screenshot of the Excel implementation of the model can be found in the Appendix. 
Equation (3.7) captures the consumption of the transport and force protection 
vehicles required to transport the required fuel from i  to j .  The values of mijC  are found 
in Table 2, in the spreadsheet, of the Appendix. 
 m m mij ij ijC F T= + . (3.7) 
Equation (3.8) calculates the IO coefficient, mija  for supply components, while 
Equation (3.9) is for consuming components.  The values of mija  in the historical scenario 




ija = the amount of output of component i  delivered by mode m  required per 
unit of output from component j  
 1
m m
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⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 for consuming components. (3.9) 
These computations can then be used in Equation (3.10) to calculate the total fuel 
required at Kandahar. 
 ij j
j
X a x=∑ , where i =  Kandahar (3.10) 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This analysis focuses on the fuel multiplier, which is one of the main benefits of 
using an IO model.  This fuel multiplier was determined in two separate ways—a 
marginal and average for each component—with each providing distinct insights into the 
dynamics of the supply chain in Afghanistan.  The multipliers were considered in 
conjunction with distance and time between locations to determine how these factors 
contributed to the differences across components seen in the multiplier. 
In order to explore the effect of various features of the model of the Afghanistan 
supply chain, six scenarios were created that altered different variables of the system.  
Each scenario was compared against the baseline (historical) scenario, comparing fuel 
multiplier and the total amount of fuel required for warfighting at the bases of operations, 
transportation fuel, and force protection fuel requirements.  These comparisons provide 
some insight on which areas of the supply chain have the largest effect on fuel usage 
through the system.  These comparisons resulted in new insights into the Afghanistan 
supply chain, while also confirming several findings in previous research. 
A. FUEL MULTIPLIERS 
A one-gallon increase in fuel usage by the end user does not translate to a one-
gallon increase in total demand for fuel entering the supply chain, but increases total fuel 
demand by a factor greater than one.  The multiplier is different at each component, due 
to the means by which the fuel is delivered to that location.  As stated previously, 
quantifying the fuel multiplier is the primary reason for using IO analysis in determining 
the FBCF.  The importance of this effect in the fuel supply chain cannot be overstated 
and is normally overlooked by other models that are used to calculate the FBCF.  An 
estimate of the fuel multiplier enables the decision maker to make more informed 




Average and marginal fuel multipliers reflect how much X , the total fuel entering the 
supply chain at Kandahar, changes with a change in the fuel demanded, jc , at  
component j . 
1. Average Fuel Multiplier 
The average fuel multiplier shows the overall amount of fuel required to be sent 
into the supply chain per gallon consumed at a given component.  If a component has a 
multiplier of 2, that means a one-gallon increase in demand at the consuming component 
results in two-gallon increase from the original source component, X , to be sent through 
the supply chain to meet the demand, assuming transport and force protection 
requirements are a constant factor of fuel flowing from each i  to each j  in the supply 
chain.  To calculate the average fuel multiplier for a given j , we look at the reduction in 
X when we set jc  equal to zero.  Letting ( )jX c  represent X  as a function of jc  , while 
holding all mija  constant, the average fuel multiplier jM  for component j  is calculated as 











2. Marginal Fuel Multiplier 
The marginal fuel multiplier for a given j , jM ′ , is the change in the total fuel 
demanded at Kandahar associated with a 1,000-gallon-per-week increase in jc .  This 
multiplier looks at the capacity of the supply chain at current levels, and can result in a 
multiplier of 1 if the supply chain is not at maximum capacity.  The marginal fuel 
multiplier is calculated as shown in Equation (4.2). 
 ( 1) ( )j j jM X c X c′ = + − . (4.2) 
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The marginal fuel multiplier in each scenario assumes there may be transportation 
vehicles in a convoy that are not filled to maximum capacity.  This does not accurately 
capture the real world actions found in Afghanistan where fuel convoys are only sent 
when at maximum capacity.  In many circumstances, these convoys are carrying other 
supplies, such as water, food, or batteries, so the fuel portion of the convoy would be 
considered a partial load. 
B. SCENARIOS 
Due to the limited data available concerning fuel usage in the Afghanistan theater 
of operation, it was determined that the best way to validate the IO model was to create 
scenarios that would change specific aspects of the supply chain to determine the effects 
those changes had on the model and fuel multiplier at each component.  Additionally, 
these scenarios were generated in such a way as to reveal the fuel drivers within a supply 
chain, so this model and its results could provide insight about supply chains in future 
AORs.  Each scenario was a modification of the historical scenario that was provided by 
Mr. Kausek, using his in-theater experience, and all findings were related back to this 
historical case.  This section describes each scenario, how it affects the supply chain, and 
the justification for its inclusion in the analysis.  Table 4 provides an overview of the 





Gal/Hr Pods (#) MATV MRAP Rear
Per
Transport
Historical 65 14:2 13.3 2 0.67 0.33 1 5
(1) Payload Increase 65 14:2 13.3 3 0.67 0.33 1 5
(2) Efficiency Increase 65 14:2 8 2 0.67 0.33 1 5
(3) Transit Limit 65 9:7 13.3 2 0.67 0.33 1 5
(4) Reduced Consumption 32.5 14:2 13.3 2 0.67 0.33 1 5
(5) Reduced Force Protection 65 14:2 13.3 2 0.67 0.33 0 10




















Table 4.   An overview of each scenario used in the IO model, highlighting the 
changes made from the historical scenario. 
1. Scenario 1 – Transport Payload Increase 
The current transportation vehicle, MTVR, has been modified by extending the 
bed of the truck to allow for extra capacity.  This modification allows the MTVR to carry 
three pods of fuel instead of the two pods the previous vehicle was limited to, thus 
increasing the amount of fuel carried per MTVR and reducing the total number of 
transport vehicles needed on each leg of the supply chain.  An increase of the pod limit 
appeared to be a logical, and rather simple, modification that could easily be incorporated 
in theater, which would have a substantial impact.  This modification also had the 
potential to affect the force protection requirements of the supply chain by reducing the 
number of MTVRs needed during the operation, thus reducing the total number of force 
protection vehicles need to protect the convoy. 
2. Scenario 2 – Transport Fuel Efficiency Increase 
A new transportation vehicle has been introduced to replace the MTVR for 
operations in Afghanistan.  While the capacity of the new vehicle remains identical to the 
current MTVR, an improved engine and drive train have been used in the new vehicle, 
allowing it to consume less fuel during operations, thereby reducing the overall fuel 
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demand in the supply chain.  The new fuel consumption rating for this vehicle is 8 
gallons an hour—a five-gallon-an-hour improvement over the MTVR.  An introduction 
of a new vehicle type onto the battlefield is well within the realm of possibility.  This 
type of event has already occurred with the force protection vehicles used in theater, 
which are in our current model.  The MRAP was a new vehicle at the beginning of 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a constant complaint concerning the vehicle was 
its fuel efficiency.  In order to address this issue, the MATV was introduced, providing 
increased fuel efficiency and the USMC has now begun to phase out the MRAP.  With 
the DoD-wide push to increase fuel efficiency, the introduction of a new, more fuel-
efficient transport vehicle is well within the realm of possibility. 
3. Scenario 3 – Increase Use of Air Assets 
Following a change of command in Afghanistan, in this scenario, a new policy 
has been put in place restricting the number of hours that a convoy is allowed to operate 
consecutively, which is a maximum of 10 hours.  Due to this restriction, all fuel 
replenishments that have a time greater than 10 hours must now be conducted by airdrop.  
This change in policy affects five bases of operation, increasing the use of air transport 
within the supply chain from 16% to 45% of the number of deliveries.  While there is not 
a precedent for this type of policy change occurring during current operations, this policy 
shift was a means to test the question of whether using air assets during fuel deliveries 
significantly increases the use and cost of fuel in the supply chain. 
4. Scenario 4 – Reduced Base Consumption 
A new supply of generators and front-line vehicles has been sent to Afghanistan 
to be used at all of the FOBs and COPs in country.  This new equipment increases fuel 
efficiency over the previous units, resulting in a reduction in fuel in the supply chain from 
65,000 gallons per week to 32,500 gallons per week.  The main emphasis in efforts to 




down range, particularly with the end user.  Creating a scenario modeling improvement 
in end-user efficiency enables an analysis to determine, under this supply chain, the level 
of cost savings achievable. 
5. Scenario 5 – Improved In-Country Security (Force Protection 
Reductions) 
With increased cooperation between local Afghans and United States troops, the 
routes convoys use to transport fuel have become safer due to the lower risk of attack and 
improved explosive device incidents.  This increased security has decreased the number 
of force protection vehicles necessary to escort the convoy.  The new force protection 
policy for convoys is one force protection vehicle in the lead of the convoy and one force 
protection vehicle for every 10 transport trucks in the convoy, thus reducing the previous 
fuel burden placed on the supply chain by force protection vehicles.  Changes to the force 
protection posture are dynamic.  This scenario captures that dynamic nature, while also 
demonstrating the flexibility of the IO model, thereby demonstrating its relevance for 
capturing the fuel multipliers within the supply chain. 
6. Scenario 6 – Force Protection Vehicle Change 
Due to the favorable feedback and success of the MATV in combat operations, 
the USMC has decided to use this vehicle exclusively for all force protection operations.  
This decision causes the overall efficiency of the convoy operations to increase due to the 
MATV’s 6.6-gallon per hour rating, replacing the MRAP’s 10.24-gallon per hour rating.  
As discussed with respect to Scenario 2, a shift in vehicle usage of this nature has already 
been occurring in the Afghanistan theater of operations.  This scenario provides a clearer 
picture of what fuel usage would look like for this supply chain once the transition from 
MRAP to MATV is complete. 
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C. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The analysis explores three key features of the supply chain:  the relative 
efficiencies of ground convoy versus airdrop; the impact of transportation and force 
protection efficiencies; and which modifications have the greatest impact on fuel usage 
throughout the supply chain. 
The data provided by Mr. Kausek were used to define the historical scenario 
against which the other scenarios were compared.  The results for the historical scenario 
are shown in Figures 4 through 6. 
 
Figure 4.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for the historical scenario, by base 




Figure 5.   Marginal fuel multiplier for the historical scenario by supply  
chain component. 
 
Figure 6.   Average fuel multiplier for the historical scenario by supply chain component. 
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The larger marginal fuel multiplier at Now Zad FOB, relative to other FOBs, can 
be attributed to the method by which it receives fuel from Camp Leatherneck.  Although 
it receives 10% of its fuel requirement by air transportation, the driving factor in the 
multiplier is the time required to deliver the fuel by ground convoy.  This observation is 
further strengthened by looking at the COPs that Now Zad supplies.  Of the seven COPs 
supported by Now Zad, Bar Now Zad has the longest travel time and the largest 
multiplier.  For ground convoys, the fuel multiplier is largely driven by the overall travel 
time.  The multiplier informs the decision maker that, under these circumstances, an 
increase in demand of 1,000 gallons at Bar Now Zad requires an additional 1,720 gallons 
to be pushed into the supply chain. 
As seen in Figure 6, the multipliers for Golistan and Now Zad are larger than the 
multiplier for Deleram (the other component that receives fuel directly from Camp 
Leatherneck), which receive all, or part, of their fuel requirement from an airdrop rather 
than a ground convoy.  This factor appears to make the multiplier higher at these 
locations than those receiving fuel solely through ground convoy.  There is a threshold 
for the total travel time to conduct a ground convoy, where it becomes more costly on a 
per gallon basis than using an airdrop to support the component.  The route between 
Deleram and Buji Bhast Pass appears to be longer than this threshold.  This supply route 
requires a total travel time of 16 hours to complete the round trip; therefore, this resupply 
would be more efficient to conduct by another means.  The verification of this insight is 
the theme of the following section of this chapter. 
1. Ground Convoy and Airdrop Methods of Delivery 
Scenarios 1 through 3 were used to analyze the effects of changes in the delivery 
methods on the supply chain.  Figures 7 through 9 illustrate the impact each scenario had 
on the overall fuel usage within the supply chain, while Table 5 provides the changes 




Figure 7.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 1, which increases the 




Figure 8.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 2, which decreases the 





Figure 9.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 3, which limits the total 
time a ground convoy can operate by base operations, fuel transportation, and 
force protection. 
 
Scenario Overall Transport Force Protection
(1) Payload Increase –4.74% –27.03% –6.98%
(2) Efficiency Increase –5.99% –36.78% 0.00%
(3) Transit Limit 6.84% 64.41% –75.06%
Change in Fuel Requirements from Historical Scenario
 
Table 5.   The change in the overall, transport, and force protection fuel requirement 
from the historical scenario for Scenarios 1 through 3. 
It is interesting to observe the reduction in force protection fuel requirements that 
is seen in Table 5 due to the increase in payload capacity of the MTVR.  A benefit of this 
impact is it will allow decision makers, with limited budgets, to evaluate improvements 
within the supply chain that will increase efficiencies not only at the point of 
improvement, but also throughout the supply chain. 
The transit limit scenario resulted in a significant decrease in the force protection 
fuel requirement in the supply chain.  This reduction is attributed to the assumption, 
consistent with historical operations, that no force protection assets are used during air 
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transports.  While this assumption could be invalid, the impact that force protection fuel 
use has on the supply chain is small, so the effects of reducing this use is negligible. 
While the raw fuel requirement numbers might indicate that air transportation is 
more costly than ground transportation, a look at the average fuel multipliers, seen in 
Figures 10 through 12, provide a better insight on this issue.  These fuel multipliers also 
help answer the question raised while analyzing the historical scenario, i.e., whether there 
is a threshold at which ground transports become more costly than airdrops in the 
Afghanistan supply chain.  While it would initially appear that these scenarios undermine 
the hypothesis that air transportation could be more cost effective than ground convoy 
transportation, a deeper analysis of the consumption numbers of each component leads to 
a mixed conclusion. 
 
Figure 10.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 1, which increases the number of pods 




Figure 11.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 2, which decreases the gallons per hour 
used by the MTVR, by supply chain component. 
 
Figure 12.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 3, which limits the total time a ground 
convoy can operate, by supply chain component. 
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One aspect that needs to be highlighted in each of these scenarios is the 
dependency that each component multiplier has on its supply component’s multiplier.  
This can clearly be seen in the case of Golistan.  During each of these scenarios, its 
method of receiving fuel remained constant, but in Scenario 3, which restricted the total 
transit time for ground convoys, Golistan’s average multiplier increased from 1.6 to 1.8.  
The reason for the increase is because of the change in transportation methods between 
Kandahar and Camp Leatherneck in this last scenario.  While the total number of assets 
required to transport the fuel between these locations decreased from 54 ground vehicles 
to 14 helicopters, the total fuel consumed during the transportation phase increased from 
roughly 6,500 gallons to 16,800 gallons.  This resulting increase was then passed on to all 
of Camp Leatherneck’s supported bases, with the increase being more apparent at 
Golistan due its direct relationship with Camp Leatherneck. 
These same observations cannot be made for the Deleram-supported COPs.  With 
the exception of Geiger, the Deleram COPs’ method of transportation shifted from 
ground to air transportation due to the new policy put in place in Scenario 3.  While the 
fuel multiplier, seen in Figure 12, at each of these COPs increased during this scenario, 
all of the increase could be attributed to the higher transportation fuel usage seen at Camp 
Leatherneck, described previously.  Again, there was a decrease in the total number of 
vehicles required between this scenario and the historical scenario, but unlike the Camp 
Leatherneck to Golistan transport, the fuel consumed during transportation from Deleram 
to its supported COPs actually decreased by as much as 75%. 
The decrease in transportation fuel consumption between Camp Leatherneck and 
Now Zad was large enough to counter the increase between Kandahar and Camp 
Leatherneck, to allow the multiplier at Now Zad to decrease.  This can be attributed to the 
need for only one helicopter being used in these parts of the supply chain instead of the 
14 required between Kandahar and Camp Leatherneck.  These results appear to point to 
the fact that the mode of transportation that should be used between specific portions of 
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the supply chain should be based not only on the total transit time of that particular leg, 
but also on the amount of fuel being transported. 
The marginal fuel multipliers from these scenarios are best illustrated by  
Figure 13, showing the results from Scenario 1.  In this scenario, the increase of 1,000 
gallons of fuel required at Buji Bhast Pass and Geiger caused the number of MTVRs 
required to transport the fuel between Deleram and these COPs to increase by one.  This 
increase triggered the fuel multiplier of the IO model, resulting in a higher multiplier at 
these locations.  For the purpose of analyzing the effects of ground versus air transports, 
the use of the marginal multiplier is not revealing because the marginal effects are 
determined by whether transportation assets are operating at capacity. 
 
Figure 13.   Marginal fuel multiplier for Scenario 1, which increases the number of pods 
the MTVR transports, by supply chain component. 
2. Impact of Transportation and Force Protection Efficiency 
Improvements 
Scenarios 1, 2, 5, and 6 show the impact of transportation and force protection 
efficiencies on the demand for fuel within the supply chain.  Figures 7, 8, 14, and 15 
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illustrate the impact each scenario had on the overall fuel usage within the supply chain, 
with Table 6 providing the change in the fuel requirement relative to the historical 
scenario. 
 
Figure 14.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 5, which reduces the 
number of force protection vehicles required during ground convoys by base 
operations, fuel transportation, and force protection. 
 
Figure 15.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 6, which uses the MATV as 
the only force protection vehicle during ground convoys by base operations, fuel 
transportation, and force protection. 
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Scenario Overall Transport Force Protection
(1) Payload Increase –4.74% –27.03% –6.98%
(2) Efficiency Increase –5.99% –36.78% 0.00%
(5) Reduced FP –2.16% –0.97% –41.15%
(6) MATV Only –0.82% –0.97% –13.72%
Change in Fuel Requirements from Historical Scenario
 
Table 6.   The change in the overall, transport, and force protection fuel requirement 
from the historical scenario for Scenarios 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
While each of these scenarios does provide a reduction in the overall fuel 
requirement of the Afghanistan supply chain, it appears that the more significant 
reductions occur while improving the transportation aspect of the system.  During the 
course of this research, many reports pointed to the force protection requirement as being 
one of the driving factors for higher fuel costs in the theater of operations (Commandant 
of the Marine Corps, 2011).  The most significant force protection fuel requirement 
reductions can be seen by merely reducing the number of vehicles required during 
convoy operations, instead of switching all vehicles to the more efficient MATV.  Again, 
the decision maker can use this insight to determine if limited funds should be allocated 
to the production of a new vehicle or focus more effort on improving the security within a 
region.  The dynamic nature of the IO model is illustrated by the reduction in force 
protection usage resulting in a decrease in the transportation portion of the supply chain. 
The average fuel multipliers for each of the scenarios must be reviewed to 
determine if there are any underlying reasons, not apparent in the overall fuel requirement 
numbers, for the changes seen in each scenario.  Figures 10, 11, 16, and 17 show the 




Figure 16.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 5, which reduces the number of force 
protection vehicles required during ground convoys, by supply chain component. 
 
Figure 17.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 6, which uses the MATV as the only 
force protection vehicle during ground convoys, by supply chain component. 
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The reductions seen in the multipliers for each component in Scenarios 5 and 6 
can be attributed to the lower overall fuel requirement in the supply chain.  These same 
conclusions apply when analyzing the marginal multipliers.  With this particular supply 
chain, the force protection requirements are minimal, so at no time do they cause an 
increase in the overall fuel requirements that can be seen in the transportation scenarios. 
3. Factors Providing the Largest Impact on Efficiencies 
Since the six scenarios capture almost all of the major types of improvements or 
changes that could realistically occur in the Afghanistan theater of operations, it is worth 
asking whether a particular course of action results in a bigger decrease in fuel 
requirements.  This analysis will provide insight into whether the concerted effort to 
reduce the fuel requirements by the end users results in the best reduction of fuel usage in 
a supply system.  Figures 7–9, 14, 15, and 18 illustrate the impact each scenario had on 
the overall fuel usage within the supply chain, with Table 7 providing the change in the 
fuel requirement from the historical scenario. 
 
Figure 18.   Total supply chain fuel consumption for Scenario 4, which reduces the 
amount of fuel used at each base by 50% by base operations, fuel transportation, 
and force protection. 
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Scenario Overall Transport Force Protection
(1) Payload Increase –4.74% –27.03% –6.98%
(2) Efficiency Increase –5.99% –36.78% 0.00%
(3) Transit Limit 6.84% 64.41% –75.06%
(4) Reduced Consumption –46.32% –37.53% –16.21%
(5) Reduced FP –2.16% –0.97% –41.15%
(6) MATV Only –0.82% –0.97% –13.72%
Change in Fuel Requirements from Historical Scenario
 
Table 7.   The change in the overall, transport, and force protection fuel requirement 
from the historical scenario for Scenarios 1 through 6. 
This analysis suggests that reducing the consumption at the end user has the 
greatest impact on the overall fuel requirement.  While this is true, even obvious, an 
interesting effect can be seen when looking only at the transportation fuel requirements.  
Based on the scenario, it would be reasonable to assume a 50% reduction in demand 
would result in a 50% reduction in transportation requirements; this, however, is not the 
case.  Rather, reducing the overall fuel requirements by 50% causes a similar reduction 
on transportation fuel requirements as improving the transport vehicles themselves.  This 
can be explained by the fact that in components such as Bar Now Zad and ANP Hill, their 
historical fuel requirement was 1,000 gallons, which, in Scenario 4, was reduced to  
500 gallons.  Each of these requirements is fulfilled by one transport vehicle, so the 
reduction in demand is not passed along to the transportation part of the supply chain. 
Figure 19 shows the average fuel multiplier of Scenario 4.  The impact of 
reducing base consumption on the fuel multiplier appears different than the pure 
requirement numbers would suggest.  The increase of COPs’ multipliers ranges from 
25% to 75% over the historical multipliers.  Although the overall fuel requirement of the 
supply chain was reduced, the higher multipliers seen at every component would 
contribute to short-term impacts to the planning process of the operational command.  
The supply officers would be making fuel purchase projections based on the new demand 
model within the supply chain.  These projections would remain accurate until there was 
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a change in demand within the system.  Using the COP of Bar Now Zad demonstrates a 
good example of this.  Under this scenario, Bar Now Zad has a multiplier of around 2.5.  
For every change in 1 gallon of demand at Bar Now Zad, it has a ripple effect of 2.5 
gallons through the supply chain.  Now, if the area around Bar Now Zad becomes a 
hotbed of activity, resulting in a spike for fuel on the order of several thousand gallons, 
the result will be either an immediate shortfall in other COPs to meet the demand at Bar 
Now Zad or Bar Now Zad’s inability to meet its assigned objectives. 
 
Figure 19.   Average fuel multiplier for Scenario 4, which reduces the amount of fuel used 
at each base by 50%, by supply chain component. 
The marginal fuel multiplier for the base requirement reduction scenario can be 
seen in Figure 20.  In the previous scenarios, the marginal multiplier does not appear to 











Figure 20.   Marginal fuel multiplier for Scenario 4, which reduces the amount of fuel 
used at each base by 50%, by supply chain component. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although IO has traditionally been used for analysis of economies, the qualities 
that made it ideal for this also could be exploited to understand DoD’s fuel requirement.  
The user or decision maker can customize the model, which allows for a more robust 
model to be created for a particular scenario.  While this makes IO extremely useful, as 
with any model, it is only as good as the data that are used to build it. 
Getting appropriate data was a major issue, which resulted in numerous 
difficulties in building the model.  The data needed to feed the model appeared to be of 
the type that should have been readily available, but this was not the case.  Systematic 
tracking of fuel in Afghanistan stopped once the fuel reached the point of entry—in this 
case, Kandahar.  For this type of model to be successfully implemented throughout the 
DoD, the tracking of fuel flows needs to be more comprehensive and the data more 
readily available, so that those responsible for making acquisition and operational 
decisions have the complete picture. 
The lack of data limited the model, which does not incorporate several cost 
elements that are found in other FBCF estimates.  These cost elements include asset 
depreciation, manpower and personnel costs, and asset casualties during operation.  
While these are not captured in this IO model, the other FBCF models fall short by not 
capturing the fuel multiplier within the entire supply chain.  This model is the first to 
capture the fuel multiplier in such a way that those individual parts of the chain can be 
evaluated.  Impacts of fuel consumption, such as greenhouse gases produced during fuel 
consumption, should be multiplied by the fuel multiplier and then attributed to the 
consuming component, thus allowing for a revised estimate to be calculated  
for emissions. 
Additionally, the fuel multipliers calculated by the current model, multiplied by 
the commodity cost of fuel, provide a lower bound for FBCF calculations, which again 
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gives the decision maker valuable information.  The IO approach can uncover the true 
root cause of inefficiencies and help identify changes with the biggest impact.  These 
insights were found by running the model through various scenarios and determining the 
average and marginal fuel multiplier at each component. 
One of the first observations pertained to the belief that force protection fuel 
usage was a major contributing factor to the overall fuel consumption of units and 
commands located in Iraq and Afghanistan (Rosenthal, 2010).  In the historical scenario, 
the impact that force protection had on the overall fuel requirements was small.  The 
previously held beliefs were the impetus for creating two distinct scenarios of varying 
force protection.  These scenarios not only provided further evidence concerning the 
effect force protection has on fuel usage, but it also provided insight that efficiencies 
gained in the area did not result in significant savings to the overall supply chain. 
Another area this research was able to provide more insight into was the most 
efficient use of ground and air assets within a particular supply chain.  Prior studies have 
claimed the use of air assets is at least twice as expensive as ground assets to transport 
fuel (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2011).  While the model did support this in providing 
evidence for some circumstances, it also demonstrated that air assets could be more 
efficient than ground convoys in other circumstances. 
The battlespace of Afghanistan is a prime example of such a supply chain, where 
careful consideration needs to be given to the methods of transportation of fuel.  This is 
due to the lack of efficient roadways that connect the different bases of operation, 
resulting in relatively short distances requiring numerous hours being spent driving in a 
convoy, when an air asset could complete the resupply operation in less than an hour.  
These results lend themselves to useful for the foreseeable future due to the areas of the 
world in which we are likely to fight future conflicts. 
A final insight from this analysis concerns the proper allocation of resources to 
improve efficiency of a fuel supply chain.  Across the DoD, a majority of the attention for 
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gaining efficiency has focused on improving the fuel use of the end users (Commandant 
of the Marine Corps, 2011).  While reducing the overall demand does have a direct 
impact on the amount of fuel transported, the model revealed an underlying issue that 
should cause decision makers to reconsider making the end user the focus of  
efficiency programs. 
When the scenario of reduced fuel consumption was introduced, the average fuel 
multipliers at each base of operation increased significantly, from 25% to 75%.  Although 
the overall fuel requirement of the supply chain was reduced, the higher multipliers seen 
at every component would contribute to short-term impacts to the planning process of the 
operational command.  The supply officers would be making fuel purchase projections 
based on the new demand model within the supply chain.  These projections would 
remain accurate until there was a change in demand within the system.  The change in 
demand would be subject to the fuel multiplier, which, for Bar Now Zad, results in a  
2.5-gallon increase at the source component for every 1-gallon increase of demand.  
These fluctuations could result in shortages throughout the supply chain, reducing the 
mission effectiveness of the components.  While efficiency improvements in every aspect 
of the supply chain should be considered, the impact they will have on the planning 
process must be evaluated.  In a combat environment, the demands of the forward 
components are constantly changing and directly impact the fuel requirements within the 
supply chain.  While the reduction of the overall fuel consumption is the goal, these 
findings illustrate there will be unintended consequences in the short-term planning 
process that could result in a loss of mission effectiveness. 
This research has provided important insight into determining FBCF within the 
DoD using an IO, but it has only scratched the surface of the wealth of benefits this 
approach will have in the future.  Future research must be conducted to expand on and 
tap into IO’s ability to provide the most flexible and accurate model for FBCF.  To do 
this, a follow-on study should incorporate the other cost factors described earlier, so the 
model can capture all aspects of the supply chain costs, instead of establishing the lower 
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bound for the FBCF.  Additionally, other supply chains should be modeled using the 
same method as the Afghanistan supply chain was, in order to determine whether the 
same insights apply across the DoD, or are a special circumstance found only in this 
particular supply chain.  By looking at diverse supply chains, other improvements or 
efficiencies could be found that apply widely to the DoD, and general rules for a 
consistent approach to using IO in the DoD could be developed.  Finally, research 
focusing on how the fuel usage data are captured would provide a way for more 
commands and organizations to take advantage of the benefits IO provides.  By 
unraveling the data collection issue, it would create a triad of efficiency (data, model, and 
implementation) that would help the DoD lead the way in reducing the United States’ 
dependence on fossil fuels. 
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APPENDIX.  SPREADSHEET IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AFGHANISTAN FBCF/IO MODEL 
The implementation of the FBCF/IO model in Excel calculating the fuel 
requirements, fuel consumption during transportation, and the per unit output by 
component to determine the total fuel required to be purchased at Kandahar. 





Ground Delerem Nowzad Golistan Buji Bakwa
MT





Kandahar 0 75.8485931 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Air 0 0 0 0 0 1.58767051 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Ground 0 0 0 0 20.3733234 14.2890346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delerem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
Nowzad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Golistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Buji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bakwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT Olympus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ANP Hill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kanji Sofla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changowal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bar Now Zad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dehanna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nomad Village 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barrows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geiger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External 82.4478351 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





Ground Delerem Nowzad Golistan Buji Bakwa
MT





Kandahar 0 6.599242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Air 0 0 0 0 0 0.43636364 0.98181818 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Ground 0 0 0 0 1.197666 4.9827168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delerem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8097056 0.7084924 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5566726 0.2984528
Nowzad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0559599 0.0373066 0.1492264 0.0932665 0.2984528 0.0932665 0.1492264 0 0
Golistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Buji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bakwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT Olympus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ANP Hill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kanji Sofla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changowal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bar Now Zad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dehanna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nomad Village 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barrows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geiger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





Ground Delerem Nowzad Golistan Buji Bakwa
MT





Kandahar 0 1.79826314 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Air 0 0 0 0 0 0.25696457 2.98181818 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Leatherneck Ground 0 0 0 0 2.07946755 2.44667677 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Delerem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8097056 3.7084924 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.5566726 1.2984528
Nowzad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0559599 1.0373066 1.1492264 1.0932665 1.2984528 1.0932665 1.1492264 0 0
Golistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Buji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bakwa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT Olympus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ANP Hill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kanji Sofla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changowal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bar Now Zad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dehanna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nomad Village 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barrows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geiger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
External 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Purchase from External 82.4478351
Consumption on site 0 30 0 0 10 8 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Output 82.4478351 45.8485931 5.00585233 40.8427408 10.3733234 7.8767051 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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